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Background: The use of supply-side incentives to increase health service utilisation and enhance service quality is
gaining momentum in many low- and middle-income countries. However, there is a paucity of evidence on the
impact of such schemes, their cost-effectiveness, and the process of implementation and potential unintended
consequences in these settings. A pay for performance (P4P) programme was introduced in Pwani region of
Tanzania in 2011.
Methods/design: An evaluation of the programme will be carried out to inform a potential national rollout. A
controlled before and after study will examine the effect of the P4P programme on quality, coverage, and cost of
targeted maternal and newborn healthcare services and selected non-targeted services at facilities in Tanzania. Data
will be collected from a survey of 75 facilities, 750 patients exiting consultations, over 75 health workers, and 1,500
households of women who delivered in the previous year, in all seven intervention districts. Data will be collected
from the same number of respondents in four control districts. A process evaluation will examine: whether the
P4P programme was implemented as planned; stakeholder response to the programme and its acceptability; and
implementation bottlenecks and facilitating factors. Three rounds of process data collection will be conducted
including a review of available P4P documents, individual interviews and focus group discussions with key
informants working at facility and district level in five of the intervention districts, and at the regional and national
levels. An economic evaluation will measure the cost-effectiveness of P4P relative to current practice from a societal
perspective.
Discussion: This evaluation will contribute robust evidence on the impact and cost-effectiveness of P4P in a low
income setting, as well as generate a better understanding of the feasibility of integrating complex intervention
packages like P4P within health systems in resource poor settings.
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Many countries are struggling to meet the Millennium
Development Goals, and achieve acceptable and effective
coverage levels for specific services, especially those
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orneed to identify mechanisms for stimulating higher
levels of service use, and ensure adequate service quality
has become paramount. There is renewed interest in the
potential for incentives, and specifically financial incen-
tives, to address these issues.
Performance based financing, payment for performance
or results based financing is ‘an intervention designed
to increase the quantity and quality of healthcare’ [3].
Payment for performance (P4P) programmes can be ap-
plied on the demand or the supply side. Supply-side incen-
tives are typically targeted at health managers, healthLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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of pre-defined performance indicators that are set out in a
performance contract [4]. Fundamentally, the approach
assumes recipients will respond to financial incentives and
be motivated to produce more and better outcomes. It has
further been hypothesized that such incentives can stimu-
late more radical system reform by increasing system re-
sponsiveness to user needs, promoting the use of health
information systems, and providing greater financial au-
tonomy to health facilities [4].
There is substantive experience with P4P mechanisms
in the health sector in high income countries. A recent
review of 25 systematic reviews in high income coun-
tries, concluded that performance based financing ‘…
can be effective in the short run for simple and distinct,
well defined behavioural goals’ [5]. There is now growing
interest in the application of such schemes in low- and
middle-income countries.
The current evidence from lower income countries is,
however, much weaker. While many studies show prom-
ising results (e.g., [6-11]), they generally suffer from
methodological weakness, with the exception of [11],
notably a lack of control group, and inability to control
for possible confounders, limiting the conclusiveness of
evidence in relation to impact. A recent systematic re-
view of performance based financing in low and middle
income settings concluded that: ‘the current evidence
base is too weak to draw general conclusions.... Longer
term questions of sustainability and cost-effectiveness
remain untested, and adverse consequences have not
been considered in most cases’ [12].
Hence, there is considerable uncertainty, not just about
the impact, but also the sustainability of P4P effects over
time, and whether such programmes represent value for
money in relation to other possible investments [13-16].
Furthermore, there has been limited exploration of how
P4P interacts with the health system, how it is perceived
by different stakeholders, and whether there may be po-
tential for unintended consequences. However, a few re-
cent publications have begun to address this issue by
adopting an ‘open box’ approach to evaluation, which
seeks to understand how interventions work, rather than
to simply measure if they work (e.g., [17,18]).
The potential risks associated with P4P are multi-fold
[19], including diverting health worker behaviour away
from un-incentivised but equally important activities. A
further risk includes supplier-induced demand, or the
unnecessary/excessive provision of services to those who
are not in need in order to meet targets. Whilst health
workers are likely to try and increase patient perceived
quality, they may compromise on those aspects of qual-
ity that matter less to patients, in order to maximise out-
put. There is also the risk of compromising on equity in
order to achieve efficiency goals. This may occur ifhealthcare providers shift their focus from ‘hard to reach’
groups to more accessible and, typically, better-off
groups who are more likely to seek care—‘cherry picking’
[3]. Further, providers may be better able to meet targets
in less deprived areas and, therefore, be more likely to
receive bonuses in these areas, potentially increasing
geographical inequity in resource availability between
providers [20].
There are also challenges in satisfactorily monitoring
performance. Providers may be tempted to artificially
inflate performance reports in order to maximise on
bonuses. This practice, referred to as ‘gaming’, which has
been reported in high-income settings [21], is more
likely to occur when validation of performance reports is
conducted internally by actors benefiting from the bonus
system, and/or when transaction costs of validation are
high, limiting the conduct of such activities [9,14].
Pay for Performance (P4P) in Tanzania
The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW)
in Tanzania with support from the Clinton Health Ac-
cess Initiative (CHAI) launched a P4P programme in
one region of Tanzania, Pwani, with funding from the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2011.
P4P was conceived as a tool to accelerate the attainment
of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4 and 5.
The P4P initiative is implemented in all seven districts
within the Pwani region. All facilities, including hospi-
tals, health centres and dispensaries within these districts
are eligible to participate in the scheme, irrespective of
ownership, on the condition that they provide reproduct-
ive and child health (RCH) services. Facilities were also
required to provide full 2010 Health Management Infor-
mation System (HMIS) data, and have bank accounts in
order to qualify for participation. In many districts,
primary level health facilities (health centres and dispen-
saries) do not have bank accounts, and hence, these
accounts were set up as part of the programme. Stake-
holders responsible for supervising facilities at district
and regional levels are also eligible for bonuses (i.e.,
Council Health Management Teams (CHMTs) at the dis-
trict level; and the Regional Health Management Team
(RHMT) at the regional level).
Performance targets were based on baseline perform-
ance in the targeted areas. Targets are fixed, although
their weighting in the overall performance score calcula-
tion may change as performance improves. Bonus pay-
ments are based on indicators for maternal and child
health services, HMIS strengthening, facility manage-
ment, and overall performance across all P4P indicators.
Facility level indicators include: couple year protection
rate; proportion of antenatal clients on malaria prophy-
laxis; proportion of newly delivered mothers who attended
postnatal clinic within seven days; proportion of children
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sles vaccination; and HMIS correctly filled and submitted
to the CHMT on time.
Additional performance indicators linked to bonus
payments at hospitals, health centres and larger dis-
pensaries include: percentage of HIV positive clients on
anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for the prevention of
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT); percentage of
newborns receiving the oral polio vaccine OPV0; and
proportion of facility-based deliveries.
The proportion of correctly completed and utilized
partographs is an additional indicator, for hospitals only.
The CHMTs and RHMT are assessed based on the
percentage of maternal and newborn deaths appropriately
audited on time, and the overall performance of the
facilities in their catchment area. In addition, CHMTs
are monitored on the proportion of facilities receiving
quarterly district health profile reports; the proportion of
facilities in the district that are included in the HMIS
monthly reports; and the proportion of facilities in the
district reporting stock outs of tracer medicines. The
RHMT is monitored on the proportion of districts in-
cluded in the HMIS reports, and submissions of semi-
annual reports to the MOHSW.
Contracts are signed between facilities and their re-
spective CHMTs, with addenda to specific targets being
made every six months, based on the previous six-
month performance cycle. Contracts are also signed be-
tween: the CHMT and the District Executive Director
(DED); and between the RHMT and the Regional Ad-
ministrative Secretary (RAS).
Facility performance reports are verified by the CHMT
and the Regional Certification Committee (RCC); districtIntroduction
Training of key stakeholders






Improve quality of care / 
increased patient satisfaction
Increased utilisation of targeted 
health services
Increased motivation of  
health workers and 
managers
Figure 1 Conceptual framework.performance reports are validated by the RCC, and
RHMT reports are validated by the National Verification
Committee (NVC), who approves payment of bonuses
by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) that acts
as fund holder. Random checks are carried out by an in-
dependent verifier.
Payment cycles occur every six months. The first pay-
ment cycle tied to performance covered the period Janu-
ary to June 2011, with payment scheduled for September
2011, but actually being made in early 2012.
The bonus is paid to the facility for disbursement to
staff and for facility operations. The maximum bonus
per facility per cycle ranges from around $723 in dis-
pensaries to $7,875 in hospitals. The staff top up
amounts to about 10% of typical monthly salaries for
maternal and child health workers.
An advisory committee was established to offer stra-
tegic direction and support to the programme and meets
quarterly. The management team overseeing operations
includes members of the MOHSW and of the CHAI.
This paper presents the protocol for the evaluation of
the P4P programme in Pwani region, providing an over-
view of the framework and methods of the evaluation.Evaluation Framework
P4P is expected to improve maternal and newborn health
through a number of pathways. There are also a number
of potentially unanticipated consequences (or risks) of
P4P that need to be monitored in order to provide timely
recommendations for improved implementation. Figure 1
presents a simplified overview of the theory of change
underpinning the evaluation that was developed withof P4P
 and provision of guidelines
nus payment to District and 
gional managers
Negative Effects




Crowding out of non-targeted health 
services 
Reduced quality of care
Damage intrinsic motivators
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with national stakeholders.
The effect of the P4P scheme will depend on how the
programme is implemented and how those stakeholders
involved in or affected by the implementation react to
the scheme. When fully implemented, P4P is expected
to improve the quality of care of targeted services through
an increase in health worker and manager motivation
to obtain bonus payment, which in turn is assumed to
increase service coverage among the population.
There are a variety of ways by which this could occur.
All rely on health worker and manager motivation to ob-
tain the bonus payment. Motivation will be a function of
the perceived attainability of the performance targets,
and the adequacy of the bonus payment level (the incen-
tive effect) as well as potential variations in these per-
ceptions over time. If motivated, health workers might
improve the quality and accessibility of the targeted ser-
vices in order to encourage patients to attend the facility
by, for example, reducing waiting time, ensuring drugs
are available at the facility, following clinical guidelines
that may lengthen consultations, reducing user charges
associated with targeted services to make them more
affordable, and being more friendly and attentive to pa-
tients, resulting in greater patient satisfaction. The P4P
programme may also affect intrinsic motivation. This ef-
fect may be positive or negative, depending on how the
bonus scheme is perceived by health workers (as fair/un-
fair; as a form of recognition or as form of control) [22].
It is anticipated that regional and district managers
and health facilities may adapt their methods of allocating
resources in order to strengthen the quality of targeted
services. In the long term, there is the possibility that the
strategy may indirectly promote equity, by encouraging
health workers to work in underserved facilities where
there are fewer staff in order to increase the size of their
bonus payment.
There are also a number of non-desired effects that
could result from the P4P scheme. It is possible that the
introduction of a bonus payment associated with the
provision of particular health services may result in
health workers adopting coercive or potentially harmful
strategies to ensure sufficient numbers of patients attend
facilities, such as delaying or avoiding referral of compli-
cated pregnancies in order to increase the number of de-
liveries at the facility. It is also possible that facilities
misreport target indicators, inflating numbers in order
to benefit from the bonus. While this should, in prin-
ciple, be detected by the district and regional levels dur-
ing data validation, there could be a potential conflict of
interest as these stakeholders also benefit from a bonus
payment, which might allow for such distortions to
occur more readily. There is also the risk that the utilisa-
tion and quality of health services that are not includedin the bonus payment will reduce, due to ‘crowding out’
by targeted services. Furthermore, some aspects of qual-
ity of the targeted services may decline over time, if
health workers become overburdened and utilisation
increases beyond available facility capacity.Objectives of the evaluation
The objectives of the evaluation are:
1. To assess the effect of the P4P initiative on the
quality and coverage of targeted maternal and
newborn healthcare services and selected non-
targeted services at facilities.
2. To examine the implementation process, stakeholder
response to and acceptability of the P4P design and
potential unintended consequences.
3. To measure the cost-effectiveness of the P4P
programme.
To address these objectives, there are three compo-
nents to the evaluation: an impact evaluation, a process
evaluation, and an economic evaluation. The specific ob-
jectives and methods of each component of the study
are reviewed in turn.Methods
Impact evaluation methods
Study design
The impact evaluation will employ a controlled before
and after study design. Surveys will be undertaken
within all seven districts in Pwani region where P4P is
being implemented before and after its introduction and
also among four control districts with no P4P, namely:
Kilwa, Mvomero, Morogoro town, and Morogoro rural.
Control districts were selected from two neighboring re-
gions such that they were as similar as possible to inter-
vention districts in relation to poverty and literacy rates,
the rate of institutional deliveries, infant mortality, popu-
lation per health facility, and the number of children
under one year of age per capita. Care was also taken to
avoid districts where programmes were underway to im-
prove maternal and child health, which could confound
results.
The impact evaluation relies on four tools that will be
administered at baseline and endline: a health facility
survey, a health worker survey, a survey of patients
exiting facilities, and a survey of women who delivered
in the previous 12 months (Figure 2). The facility survey,
health worker survey, and exit interviews will be con-
ducted at all sampled facilities. The household survey
will be administered to households within the catchment
areas of these facilities to complement the data compiled
during the facility survey [11].
Intervention areas
7 districts of Pwani
region
Control areas
3 districts in Morogoro region
and 1 district in Lindi region  




1 facility survey at each 
facility
1-2 health workers 
surveyed at each facility
10 exit interviews with 
patients at each facility
20 interviews with women from 
the catchment area of each 
facility
Figure 2 Overview of impact evaluation data collection tools
and sampling strategy.
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The health facility survey aims to measure the effects of
P4P on service availability and provision at the sampled
facilities. It is comprised of three sections. In the first sec-
tion, questions focus on basic service provision within
the facility (staffing levels, opening hours, facility man-
agement, as well as facility infrastructure). The second
section of the survey compiles equipment and drug
availability data. The third section captures HMIS data
on service utilisation, facility expenditures and revenues
for the 12-month period before P4P was implemented
(January to December 2010 (at baseline) and the period
from January 2011 to December 2012 (at endline). The
health facility survey will be administered to the facility
in-charge or in his/her absence to a knowledgeable
health worker or administrator.
The health worker survey tool aims to measure the
effects of P4P on health workers’ working conditions
and attitudes towards work at the selected facilities.
The exit interview survey primarily intends to measure
the effect of the P4P initiative on a range of subjective
and objective indicators of quality of care for targeted
and selected non-targeted services. The survey will also
examine the effect of P4P on the cost of these services.
Respondents eligible for interview include women of
reproductive age (aged between 16 to 49 years) attending
antenatal or postnatal care, or women with children
under-one year of age coming for a preventive check up
or an immunisation for the baby. These patients will
respond to questions linked to the services targeted by
P4P. Patients attending care for non-targeted services
will also be interviewed. Non-targeted service users will
include: women of reproductive age who are not preg-
nant, or children under five years of age accompanied bya woman of reproductive age, reporting with fever and
no cough (as a proxy for malaria), or fever and cough
(as a proxy for acute respiratory infection – ARI), or
diarrhoea. These conditions were chosen as they were
the three most significant conditions reported at out-
patient departments in Tanzania in 2009.
A survey of women who had delivered within the pre-
vious 12 months will also be carried out. The women’s
survey addresses the effects of P4P on service use during
pregnancy, place of delivery, birth weight and postpar-
tum care and care for the newborn as well as related
costs and service satisfaction. Household socioeconomic
status is also measured in this survey. The core indica-
tors for each of the surveys are shown in Table 1.
Sampling
The health facility is the primary sampling unit. Facilities
were sampled from those that were eligible to participate
in the P4P scheme (they offered reproductive and child
health services and had submitted a one year backlog of
HMIS data, enabling performance targets to be mea-
sured). All eligible hospitals (n = 6) and health centres
(n = 16) from the intervention districts were included in
the sample along with all eligible non-public dispensaries
(n = 11). An equivalent number of facilities in control
areas were sampled by level of care. Public dispensaries
were sampled at random with probability proportional
to the number of public dispensaries in a given district
(n = 42). In control areas, hospitals and health centres
were sampled to match as closely as possible with se-
lected intervention facilities in terms of annual out-
patient care visits and staffing levels. A total of 75 health
facilities were sampled from intervention districts, and
75 were sampled from control districts (Figure 2). In
Pwani region, 46% of all facilities in the region were in-
cluded in the sample.
The aim of the sampling procedure for the selection of
health facilities was to seek district representation, while
for the health worker survey it was to obtain the views,
attitudes, and perceptions of at least one health worker
per facility. No sample size calculation was therefore car-
ried out. In dispensaries, one health worker will be inter-
viewed. If more than one health worker is on duty,
preference will be given to someone other than the in-
charge to avoid overburdening them with questions (as
they will be interviewed for the facility survey). In health
centres and hospitals, two health workers will be inter-
viewed. The health workers will be selected at random
from those who are on duty at the facility on the day the
interviewers are present.
For the exit and household surveys, the sample size
calculation was based on the formula by Hayes and
Bennett, 1999, adjusted for the cluster design of the
study at the facility level [23]. We estimated the size
Table 1 Overview of core indicators for each of the surveys
Type of impact Indicators Data source
Quality of care % babies weighed at birth Women’s survey
% patients prescribed drugs outside facility Exit interview
Average waiting time for targeted services in minutes
Average waiting time non-targeted services in mins
Average consultation time for targeted services in mins
Average consultation time for non targeted services in mins
% reporting overall quality satisfactory
% did blood test during ANC
% did blood pressure during ANC
% prescribed iron tablets during ANC
% prescribed drugs for malaria during ANC
% counselling for HIV
% tested for HIV
% women examined during PNC
% health workers satisfied with medicine availability Health worker survey
% health workers satisfied with functioning equipment availability
% health workers satisfied with medical supplies availability
Mean no. Of clinical cadre Facility survey
Mean no. Of nursing cadre
Mean no. Of paramedical cadre
% facilities being renovated in past year
% facilities with access to electricity
% facilities with access to piped water/hand pump
% facilities with toilet facilities
% facilities offering 24 hour delivery services
% facilities where skilled providers attend home deliveries
Average no of beds in the maternity ward for health centers/hospitals
% facility with stock out of DPT vaccine type in past 90 days
% facility with stock out of measles vaccine in past 90 days
% facilities with oxytocin stock outs in past 90 days
% facilities with ORS stock outs in past 90 days
% facilities with stock outs of all ARVs in past 90 days
% facilities with partograph stock outs in past 90 days
% facilities with gas for vaccine refrigeration stock outs in past 90 days
% facilities reporting all contraceptive pill types stock out in past 90 days
% facilities reporting delivery kits stock out in past 90 days
% facilities reporting broken equipment disrupted the provision of services in past 90
days
Service utilization % women delivering in a health facility Women’s survey
% of women who had 4 or more ANC visits
Average months pregnant at first ANC visit
% c-section rate
% newborn immunised before going home
% women treated for HIV Women’s survey and exit
interview
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Table 1 Overview of core indicators for each of the surveys (Continued)
% women who received postnatal care within 2 months of birth in a health facility
Number of PNC visits in a health facility
% of women who were examined during PNC
Timing after birth for first visit in days Women’s survey
% of children getting BCG
% of children fully immunised for polio (among appropriate age group)
% of children fully immunised for DPT (among appropriate age group)
% measles fully immunised for measles (among appropriate age group)
% women currently using a family planning method
Mean annual outpatient visits under 5 Facility survey
Mean annual outpatient visits all age groups
Mean annual inpatient admissions under 5
Mean annual inpatient admissions all age groups
Mean annual ANC service utilization (all ANC and first ANC)
Mean annual delivery service utilization (normal delivery)
Mean annual FP visits
Mean number of under 1 year olds receiving DPT vaccine
Mean number of under 1 year olds receiving polio vaccine
Mean number of under 1 year olds receiving measles vaccine
Mean number of infants receiving BCG vaccine
Motivation, work
conditions
% health workers reporting increase in working hours in past 12 months Health worker survey
% health workers reporting last external supervision occurred in past 90 days
% health workers receiving salary increase in last 12 months
% health workers reporting performance to be the reason for salary increase
% health workers reporting being motivated to work hard
% health workers satisfied with their salary
% health workers satisfied with their employment benefits
% health workers satisfied with promotion opportunities
Economic effects % paying for delivery at public facility Women’s survey
% patients attending targeted services paying for services Exit interview
% patients attending non-targeted services paying for services
Equity % service use among poorest compared to least poor women/children Women’s survey and exit
interview
% reporting payment for services among poorest compared to least poor women
Health - behavioural Average weight of baby in kg Women’s survey
% reporting small baby
% breastfeeding within 1 hr of birth
Mean annual number of low birth weight babies Facility survey
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114 minutes (SD 66) [24] to 95 minutes, with a k value
of 0.25, 80% power and a significance level at of 5% (two
tailed test). We did not increase the sample size to ac-
count for non-response because response rates of 100%
were observed in previous studies in Tanzania [25,26].
The estimated sample size was 10 exit interviews per
facility, equivalent to a total of 750 interviews inintervention and control areas respectively. A balance in
the number of interviews between antenatal, postnatal
clients and non-targeted services will be sought.
Exit interview patients will be approached by inter-
viewers upon entry to the health facility and asked a
series of screening questions to check their eligibility.
Eligible patients will then be asked for their informed
consent to participate in the study. This process will be
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ting respondents has been attained. Participants will
then be monitored by the interviewers from their time
of arrival at the facility until their time of departure, and
the waiting and consultation times will be measured
using a stopwatch. The cadre of the provider seen by the
woman/child will also be recorded by the interviewer.
The survey tool will be administered to patients upon
completion of their consultation in a quiet location
within the facility, at distance from providers and other
patients.
For the household survey, we estimated that the re-
quired sample size to detect an 11 percentage point in-
crease in institutional deliveries (from 50 to 61%), with k
value of 0.25, 90% power, and a significance level at of
5% (two tailed test), and a 90% response rate, was 20
households per cluster, equivalent to 1,500 women per
study arm. The following process was followed to iden-
tify eligible households. First, villages were sampled from
the facility catchment area; for all dispensaries, the vil-
lage where the facility is located will be selected by the
research team; for health centres and hospitals, two vil-
lages will be selected at random from all villages lying
within the ward where the facility is located. Second, all
hamlets (comprising approximately 100 households)
within this village/these villages, and located within the
catchment area of the facility will be identified; a ran-
dom sample of four of these hamlets will then be se-
lected. In the case of dispensaries, all four hamlets will
reside within the selected village. In the case of health
centres and hospitals, two hamlets will be sampled from
each village. Third, five households will be sampled from
each of the selected hamlets, amounting to a total of 20
households within each facility’s catchment area; house-
holds will be selected at random from the selected
hamlets using a modified Expanded Programme of Im-
munisation (EPI) type sampling scheme that ensures an
equal chance of any household being selected.1
Process evaluation
The process evaluation aims to compare what was
planned to what is actually happening in practice, in-
corporating issues related to the acceptability of the
scheme to various stakeholders, as well as the context of
implementation, in an attempt to understand potential
facilitating or debilitating factors that might explain vari-
ation in implementation. We will track indicators of
health worker and manager satisfaction, supervision and
verification, and implementation constraints and facilita-
tors; as well as examine how specific issues such as facility
ownership, facility resources, and governance structures
affect the implementation of the programme at the facility
level. The process data will be used to get a better under-
standing of the reasons for any P4P effect or a lack ofeffect, as well as potential unintended consequences.
Table 2 presents a list of qualitative indicators used to
monitor the progress of implementation at district level.
Three rounds of qualitative data will be collected
throughout the programme life cycle to explore how
perspectives and knowledge change over the course of
implementation and to inform the continued imple-
mentation of the programme.
The first round of data collection will take place in a
sample of 15 health facilities from five of the seven inter-
vention districts. A total of 54 interviews and four focus
group discussions (FGDs) will be conducted with key
stakeholders at facility, district, regional, and national
levels. Districts were selected to offer variation in rela-
tion to geographical location, skilled birth attendance
coverage and achieved performance targets during the
first cycle. Three facilities were purposively selected
within each district to offer a mix of ownership and level
of care as well as differing levels of baseline performance.
In rounds two and three, data will be collected from
facilities in a subsample of the round one districts using a
mix of individual interviews and focus group discussions.
Interview guides for each round were developed for the
following stakeholder groups (the CHMTs, the district P4P
focal person, health facility in-charges, health workers, the
RHMT, the Health Facility Governing Committee (HFGC),
and national level stakeholders). Contextual information
will also be collected in each district.
Economic evaluation
The objective of the economic evaluation is to ascertain
whether P4P represents value for money. The study will
be carried out from a societal perspective, which in-
cludes all agencies or bodies that are involved in imple-
mentation or who incur costs or may be affected by the
intervention, for example: the implementers (e.g., gov-
ernment (MOHSW, the Prime Minister’s Office – Re-
gional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG)), the NHIF, and CHAI; as well as those who are
affected by implementation and may incur costs as a
result (e.g., households, health workers, district health
managers).
We will estimate both the financial costs of each activ-
ity (i.e., what is paid out by the funding body—all finan-
cial transactions), as well as the economic costs, which
include the value of all resources valued at their oppor-
tunity cost. Similarly, any donated or subsidised items
will be valued at market prices.
Costs and cost-effectiveness of the P4P programme
will be compared to the current situation (doing noth-
ing). Costs will be classified according to project activ-
ities (start-up activities and ongoing activities) as well as
by resource inputs (recurrent items such as staff, sup-
plies, transport etc., as well as capital costs such as
Table 2 Process monitoring subthemes
Specific objective Qualitative indicators
Acceptability of P4P - Size of bonus payment and fairness, and rationale (support or control).
- Extent to which targets are achievable.
- Effect of P4P on working relations between stakeholders
- Difficulties/ ease of implementing P4P
- Extent to which bonus payments are motivating, and changes in perceptions over time
Context of implementation - District leadership and governance of health services
- Supervision
- Access barriers to care (geographical, transport, cultural; other)
- Other interventions underway that target maternal and child health and may influence observed outcomes;
- Other changes in society that may affect access and utilization of health services.
Implementation process - Training process
- Awareness and understanding of P4P




- Bonus payment transparency
- Timeliness of bonus payments
- Methods for dealing with misreported indicators
- Use of bonus payments - adherence to guidelines, transparency, fairness?
System changes - Effect on procedures and practices of recording and reporting of information.
- Fund management
- Supervision frequency and content
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over the lifetime of the project. Start-up costs will in-
clude those resources used during training of providers
and other stakeholders; contracting; entering baseline
HMIS data, and target setting; provision of guidelines;
and establishment of a steering committee. Ongoing
costs will include those resources used during data pro-
cessing; verification; strategies adopted by facilities, dis-
tricts, and regions to meet targets; fund payout; and
review and modification of targets.
Programme cost data will be derived from project ac-
counts and through interviews with key implementation
stakeholders. Interviews with district, regional, and na-
tional stakeholders will be undertaken to allocate staff
time to activities as well as to identify and value re-
sources and time invested in the programme that is not
paid for. Facility data will be used to ascertain to what
extent increased service use results in costs to the health
system in terms of additional staff or beds, for example,
or to what extent there is spare capacity and such an
increase can be readily absorbed within the system.
Household costs will be captured during the baseline
and endline household surveys and will enable the meas-
urement of the societal costs of an eventual serviceincrease due to the programme, as well as changes in
the levels of out of pocket payments.Data management
To provide quality assurance within the impact evalu-
ation, survey data will be checked by supervisors at the
end of each day of data collection. Household, exit, and
health worker interview data will be collected using
hand held devices (Samsung Galaxy tablets 7.0 and
Huawei IDEOS phones) with skip and quality check
functions to minimize data entry error. Facility data will
be captured on paper and double entered. Data will be
backed up on CD each day in a Microsoft Access Data-
base, and converted to Stata for analysis. Hard copies of
questionnaires will be stored in a lockable room. Elec-
tronic output will be anonymised.
Interviews and focus groups conducted as part of the
process and economic evaluation will be conducted in
Kiswahili and recorded using sound digital recorders.
Audio sound files will be transcribed and translated into
English by the bilingual researchers who conducted the
interviews. All translated data obtained from interviews
and focus group discussions will be entered into QSR
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and into Microsoft Excel for the economic evaluation.Analysis strategies – quantitative data
Impact data will be checked first for consistency and
after export to Stata, data cleaning will be undertaken.
Binary variables (Yes = 1, No = 0) will be created for all
categorical variables. All binary and continuous variables
will be summarized by calculating means and standard
deviations. A comparison of all variables between inter-
vention and control arms will be made at baseline. Tests
of differences in means between intervention and con-
trol groups will be conducted using the Adjusted Wald
F-test. Principal component analysis (PCA) will be used
for creating socioeconomic status (SES) indices for
household and exit interview data analysis using data
collected on household size and characteristics, access to
utilities, durable asset ownership, food security, house-
hold expenditures, head of household marital status,
highest level of education attained, and main occupation.
Data that use a Likert scale (e.g., dissatisfied = 1, neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied = 2, satisfied = 3) will be ana-
lyzed by calculating individual mean scores for each vari-
able. Factor analysis will be used on patient satisfaction
and health worker motivation data for identifying the
underlying factors or themes within the data.
At endline, we will compare the main outcome indica-
tors for each of the survey tools between intervention
and control arms, using data for twelve months of inter-
vention. We will estimate a multivariate regression spe-
cification of the difference – in - difference model in
which an individual’s (woman, patient, health worker,
facility) outcome is regressed against a dummy variable,
indicating whether the facility was eligible for P4P (i.e.,
providing reproductive and child health services, had
submitted the backlog of HMIS data, and performance
reports), a facility fixed effect, a year indicator, and a
series of individual and household characteristics (in the
case of patients and women). For household and exit
data, we will calculate robust standard errors, clustered
at the facility level to correct for correlation of the error
terms across patients within facilities, and across house-
holds in facility catchment areas.Analysis strategies – qualitative data
Transcripts from interviews and focus group discussions
will be read systematically and independently by each of
the researchers, and coded applying thematic content
analysis, which identifies recurrent themes that form a
cluster of linked categories containing similar meanings.
To validate findings, we will triangulate data across re-
spondent groups and look for supporting documentary
evidence, where available. Analyses will be undertakenon an ongoing basis as transcripts and other information
from the study sites become available.
Ethical issues
The evaluation study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Ifakara Health Institute and the
Ethics Review Board of the London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine. The study design and protocol were
also approved by the P4P Management Team that in-
cludes members of the MOHSW. Presentations of the
proposed research methods were also made to the P4P
steering committee that includes CHAI, MOHSW and
the Government of Norway. Prior to undertaking data
collection, letters were sent to respective District Execu-
tive Directors (DEDs) copied to District Medical Officers
(DMOs) informing them of the study and its objectives.
Subsequently, visits were made to the DMOs to agree
on dates for data collection. An information sheet was
left at the DMO’s office. Information sheets and consent
forms were provided to all those participating in the
study. Written consent was obtained prior to undertak-
ing all interviews and FGDs.
Discussion
The introduction of P4P in Tanzania aims to increase
service utilisation, and also stimulate better quality of
care, by making the system more responsive to user
needs. However, health worker response to financial in-
centives, and potential for improving quality of care and
service uptake, in a context where system constraints are
substantial, and supervision systems are weak, is unclear.
This evaluation will contribute robust evidence on the
impact and cost-effectiveness of P4P in a low-income
setting, as well as generate a better understanding of
how complex intervention packages like P4P interact
with the health system. This will be the first evaluation
study of a P4P scheme that examines the intervention
impact, its cost-effectiveness, and process of implemen-
tation. This will contribute to an expanding knowledge
base in this area, and address questions that have not
previously been explored in low-income settings, such as
the cost-effectiveness of P4P, and its impact on equity:
do better off households benefit more from service ac-
cess?; are better-off facilities better able to achieve tar-
gets, and access bonus payments? The study will provide
a close examination of the process of implementation
and contribute to understanding the factors associated
with successful performance and some of the barriers to
achieving targets, potential unintended consequences, as
well as the effect on service use and quality of targeted
and non-targeted services.
The main design constraint facing the evaluation is the
timing of the baseline evaluation, which took place dur-
ing the course of the first payment cycle but before
Borghi et al. Implementation Science 2013, 8:80 Page 11 of 12
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/8/1/80payments were made in most cases. The risk is that
baseline data will already be affected by the intervention,
minimising the overall observed P4P effect. Process data
revealed that knowledge of the programme was very lim-
ited at this time. To get around this issue in the house-
hold survey, households with women who had given
birth prior to the first payment cycle will be selected.
Health workers will be also asked to report on their
working conditions and practices prior the introduction
of P4P. The facility survey will compile information on
the situation in the past 90 days, and service use statis-
tics in the previous year (at baseline) and two years (at
endline). The survey tool that is most susceptible to the
timing effect is the exit interview. If baseline differences
are identified between intervention and control sites,
that lend support to a potential P4P effect, then appro-
priate adjustments will be made in the endline analysis.
A further limitation is the short time frame for the
impact evaluation that evaluates effects over a one year
period. The process evaluation explores changes over
the time frame of the evaluation but it will not shed light
on the extent to which these changes are sustained in
the longer run.
Endnote
1At the centre of the hamlet the supervisor throws a
pen to determine the direction, and counts 10 houses in
the direction indicated by the pen. A number is picked
at random by writing down ten numbers and picking
one at random. The house with the corresponding num-
ber is the starting point for data collection. The super-
visor introduces the study to the household head, or a
representative of the household and asks him/her if
there are any eligible women living in the household: a
woman aged 16 to 49 who had a baby between Oct 2010
and Oct 2011. If there is an eligible woman, they leave a
copy of the consent form with them and ask if it would
be convenient to return for interview the next day, at an
agreed time. The pen is then thrown again and the next
household in the direction of the pen is selected for
interview. The supervisor continues going household to
household in this way until five eligible households
consenting to being interviewed are identified. If there is
a junction in the path, the supervisor throws a pen again
to determine the direction.
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